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Game Theoretic Analysis for MIMO Radars with
Multiple Targets
Anastasios Deligiannis, Student Member, IEEE, Sangarapillai Lambotharan, Senior Member,
IEEE, and Jonathon A. Chambers, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—This paper considers a distributed beamforming
and resource allocation technique for a radar system in the
presence of multiple targets. The primary objective of each
radar is to minimize its transmission power while attaining an
optimal beamforming strategy and satisfying a certain detection
criterion for each of the targets. Therefore, we use convex
optimization methods together with noncooperative and partially
cooperative game theoretic approaches. Initially, we consider
a strategic noncooperative game (SNG), where there is no
communication between the various radars of the system. Hence
each radar selfishly determines its optimal beamforming and
power allocation. Subsequently, we assume a more coordinated
game theoretic approach incorporating a pricing mechanism.
Introducing a price in the utility function of each radar/player,
enforces beamformers to minimize the interference induced to
other radars and to increase the social fairness of the system.
Furthermore, we formulate a Stackelberg game by adding a
surveillance radar to the system model, which will play the role of
the leader, and hence the remaining radars will be the followers.
The leader applies a pricing policy of interference charged to
the followers aiming at maximizing his profit while keeping the
incoming interference under a certain threshold. We also present
a proof of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium
(NE) in both the partially cooperative and noncooperative games.
Finally, the simulation results confirm the convergence of the
algorithm in all three cases.
Index Terms—MIMO radar, beamforming, power allocation,
game theory, multistatic radar, Nash equilibrium, noncooperative
game, cooperative game, Stackelberg game, pricing consideration
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPLE-input multiple-output (MIMO) radar is aninnovative technology that has raised expectations over
the last decade that it will provide substantial improvements to
the currently used radar systems. The main characteristic that
allows MIMO radar to offer superior capabilities as compared
to other radar regimes is its waveform diversity, which implies
that MIMO radar can use multiple antennas to simultaneously
transmit several orthogonal waveforms and multiple antennas
to receive the reflected signals from the targets [1]. There
are two principal MIMO radar schemes considered in the
literature, the systems incorporating colocated antennas and
those that consist of widely separated antennas (bistatic, mul-
tistatic) [2], [3]. The leading fields of research within MIMO
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radar technology are beamformer and waveform design, de-
tection optimization and radar imaging [4]-[6]. Succeeding
the advances in those fields, the main advantages offered by
MIMO radar are higher angular resolution, direct applicability
of adaptive array techniques, multiple targets detection and
the ability to obtain spatial diversity in the target’s radar
cross section (RCS). Nevertheless, one substantial drawback
in a multiple target, distributed radar system, that has not yet
been completely resolved, is the multiple source interference
imposed at the receivers of each radar. More specifically, the
inter-radar 1, the intra-radar 2 and the clutter interference
lead to reduced efficiency and performance degradation of
the radar system. Hence, an optimal beamforming and power
allocation strategy is crucial as it minimizes the interference in
between the radars of the same organization, while preserving
a detection criterion. Game theory is a natural and effective
tool for modeling this kind of interactions, as it offers a
mathematical framework of conflict and cooperation between
intelligent, self-interested and rational players.
The increasing need for independent, autonomous and de-
centralized communication systems has sparked much interest
in using game theoretic techniques in the communication lit-
erature [7]. More specifically, the aforementioned distributed,
multistatic beamforming and resource allocation problem in
radar systems can be compared to similar issues raised in
multicell wireless systems in communication applications [8]-
[16]. In [8], the authors introduced the idea of joint beam-
forming and power control, proposing an iterative algorithm
to simultaneously obtain the optimal beamforming and power
vectors. The incorporation of game theory in this context then
rapidly became a focal point in communications research [9]-
[14]. The majority of this literature considers the technique
of strategic noncooperative games (SNG), where each player
selfishly maximizes its payoff function, given the strategies of
the other players. The authors of [9] exploited an iterative
water-filling algorithm to reach the Nash equilibrium in a
non-cooperative, distributed, multiuser power control problem.
Since each player greedily optimizes its utility function, the
equilibrium might not be the Pareto-optimal solution. Intro-
ducing pricing policies to the system resources leads to a
more Pareto-efficient solution and increases the social welfare
of the system. A pricing regime that is a linear function of
the transmit power was studied in [10]. Another example of
1Cross channel (direct) and indirect interference induced among different
radars.
2Interference imposed from the transmitters to the receivers of the same
radar when detecting two or more different targets.
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pricing the transmit power of each player is considered in [11],
whereas in [12] and [13] the pricing policy is applied on the
intercell interference among the players. In [14], the authors
consider the optimization of a set of precoding matrices at each
node of a multi-channel, multi-user cognitive radio MIMO
network in order to minimize the total transmit power of the
network, while applying a pricing scheme based on global
information. Cooperative game theoretic techniques combined
with a two-level Stackelberg game were utilized in [15] to
address the problem of relay selection and power allocation
without the knowledge of channel state information (CSI).
Finally, the authors in [16] formulated a Stackelberg Bayesian
game to obtain the optimal power allocation for a two-tier
network, while applying an interference constraint at the leader
and considering channel gain uncertainty.
Game theory is also an efficient tool to overcome various
problems that arise in radar systems. In particular, the authors
in [17] approached the problem of polarimetric waveform de-
sign by considering a zero-sum game between an opponent and
the radar system engineer. The zero-sum game was also used in
[18] to investigate the interaction between a MIMO radar and
an intelligent target, that applies jamming techniques. Potential
game theory was exploited in [19] with the main objectives of
optimal waveform design and maximization of the signal-to-
interference plus noise ratio (SINR). A non-cooperative game
theoretic per antenna power optimization based on signal-
to-disturbance ratio (SDR) estimation with a desired SINR
constraint was investigated in [20]. Non-cooperative game
theory was also employed in [21] to facilitate the power control
problem in a radar network. To address the power allocation
problem the authors of [22] used a cooperative game approach
and exploited the Shapley value solution scheme.
In this paper, inspired by the aforementioned game theo-
retic methods applied in communications [10]-[14], although
reinvestigated to adapt to the radar case, we have developed
a broad game theoretic analysis for the optimal beamforming
and resource allocation problem in a MIMO tracking radar
system with multiple targets. Initially, we consider an SNG,
where each radar/player greedily optimizes the beamforming
and power allocation vectors in two stages. In the first stage,
the optimal transmit and receive beampatterns are designed
by exploiting convex optimization techniques in a power min-
imization problem, while attaining a certain detection criterion.
After designing the optimal beampatterns, the primary joint
beamforming and resource allocation problem reduces to a
power only minimization game. Thus, in the second stage of
the game we obtain the best response strategy of a radar in an
SNG setup and show that it is a standard function [32], which
proves the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, similar to the
work in [12] for wireless communication applications.
The fact that each radar acts selfishly and does not take into
account the damage it may inflict to other radars, through inter-
radar interference, leads to a solution that may not be optimal
from a social welfare point of view. Since we assume that the
radars belong to the same organization, it is safe to consider
some sort of cooperation and introduce a pricing policy to
all players in order to minimize the interference induced to
other radars. More specifically, the radars are encouraged to
steer their beams in directions that cause less damage to other
players, which results in a more Pareto-optimal solution.
In order to complete our radar model, we incorporate a
surveillance radar as part of the previously studied MIMO
tracking radar system. The main application of the surveillance
radar is to continuously search the operating area for new
incoming targets. By adding a surveillance radar, our hybrid
radar system is capable of both acquiring new targets and
tracking every target in an operating field. However, all radars
operate simultaneously and hence the tracking radars interfere
with the surveillance radar and increase the probability of
false alarm. In order to secure the smooth operation of the
system, we set a maximum limit of interference induced at
the surveillance radar. In order to achieve both the target
SINR and to guarantee the interference limit at the surveillance
radar, we utilize a Stackelberg game approach. In particular,
the surveillance radar is the leader and the MIMO tracking
radars are the followers in the hierarchy of the game. We next
introduce the system model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1: A multistatic MIMO radar network with two radars
and two targets.
We consider a multistatic radar network that consists of
K separate radars each consisting of M transmit/receive
antennas. The set of radars is denoted by C = {1, . . . ,K}. In
order to complete the model, L targets are assumed in the
far-field of the radars, so that the main objective for each
radar is to attain a specific detection performance for every
target using the minimum possible transmission power. In the
noncooperative design of the multistatic radar network, the
radars try to minimize their transmission power independently,
having full knowledge of the uplink and the downlink channels
of their own radar, whereas they have no knowledge of the
inter-radar channel gains. Since we consider that the radars
belong to the same organization, the design of the model is not
competitive, as there is no deliberate interference between the
radars. However, as we do not assume communication between
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radars a noncooperative game is appropriate. An example of
a multistatic radar network with two radars, two targets and
clutter in the far-field is illustrated at Fig.1.
In order to detect the lth target, the transmit array of
the kth radar emits the lth element of the independent,
predesigned waveform vector ψk(t) = [ψk1(t), . . . , ψkL(t)]
T
of size L × 1, which satisfies the orthogonality condition∫
T0
ψk(t)ψ
H
k (t)dt = IL, where (·)T denotes the transpose
operator, t refers to the time index within the radar pulse, T0
is the radar pulse width, IL is the L× L identity matrix, and
(·)H denotes the Hermitian transpose operator. Thus, the wave-
forms corresponding to different targets are not correlated, i.e.∫
T0
ψkl(t)ψkl′(t)dt = 0, where l 6= l′. We assume that the
waveform vector maintains the orthogonality condition for a
set of acceptable time delays τa, τa′ and Doppler frequency
shifts fDa, fDa′ , such as [23]:
∫
T0
ψka(t−τa)ψka′(t−τa′)ej2pi(fDa−fDa′ )tdt ≈
{
1, if a = a′
0, if a 6= a′
However, if the waveforms arrive with considerable delays and
Doppler shifts, we may expect nonzero correlation between
waveforms. This correlation factor is denoted as:
%k,l,l′(τl,l′) =
∫
T0
ψkl(t)ψkl′(t+ τl,l′)e
j2pi(∆f)tdt
where τl,l′ is the relevant delay of the waveform returned
from the lth target as compared to the delay of the waveform
returned from l′th target. The relative difference in Doppler
frequency is given by ∆f = fDl−fDl′ . This introduces inter-
ference between the signals returning from different targets,
as discussed later.
The M × 1 vector which consists of the complex elements
of the signal transmitted from the kth radar and intended for
the lth target is of the form
xkl(t) = wt(k,l)ψkl(t)
where wt(k,l) is the M ×1 transmit beamforming vector from
radar-k to target-l. Hence, the overall transmitted signal from
radar-k is
xk(t) =
L∑
l=1
xkl(t) =
L∑
l=1
wt(k,l)ψkl(t)
As depicted in Fig.1, hkl is the channel gain vector from target-
l to radar-k, ckl denotes the interfering signal returns from
the clutter when the kth radar tags target-l. The cross-channel
gain between radar-k and radar-i is denoted as µki and λkij
represents the inter-radar interfering signal channel at the kth
radar echoing from the jth target and emitted from the ith
radar. The uplink and downlink parts of the path gains can
be obtained by the following equations with respect to the
transmit beamforming vectors and the receive beamforming
vectors respectively:
ht(kl) = b(θkl)wHt(k,l)a(θkl)βl
hr(kl) = b(θkl)wHr(k,l)a(θkl)βl
ct(kl) = b(θcl(k))wHt(k,l)a(θcl(k))βcl
cr(kl) = b(θcl(k))wHr(k,l)a(θcl(k))βcl
µt(ki) =
L∑
j=1
b(θrad(k,i))wHt(k,j)a(θrad(i,k))
µr(ki) =
L∑
j=1
b(θrad(k,i))wHr(k,j)a(θrad(i,k))
λt(kij) = b(θki)wHt(i,j)a(θij)βj
λr(kij) = b(θki)wHr(i,j)a(θij)βj
where wr(k,l) is the M × 1 receive weight vector for radar-k
when aimed at target-l, βl is the complex amplitude propor-
tional to the radar cross section (RCS) of target-l, βcl denotes
the RCS amplitude of the clutter and a(θkl) and b(θkl) are
the M × 1 transmit and receive steering vectors for radar-k
respectively as defined below:
a(θkl) = [1, ej
2pi
λ dsin(θkl), . . . , ej
2pi
λ (M−1)dsin(θkl)]T
b(θkl) = [1, ej
2pi
λ dsin(θkl), . . . , ej
2pi
λ (M−1)dsin(θkl)]T
where d is the distance between the adjacent antennas and is
considered the same for all radars, θkl is the azimuth direction
of target-l by considering radar-k as reference, θcl(k) is the
direction of the clutter as seen from the kth radar and θrad(k,i)
is the direction of radar-i as observed from radar-k and λ is
the wavelength of the transmitted signal. From the definition,
it is apparent that the transmit and receive steering vectors are
equal, as the uplink and downlink channels remain constant
over the duration of a full game.
By matched-filtering at the receiver of radar-k each of the
orthogonal waveforms ψkl(t − τl)ej2pifDlt, l = 1, ..., L, the
desired received signal for the detection of target-l is obtained
by
ydes(kl) = wHr(k,l)ht(kl) (1)
Considering a distributed, multistatic and multitarget radar
scheme, the detection of a target is deteriorated by direct and
collateral inter-radar interference, in addition to the interfer-
ence induced by the signals intended for other targets by the
same radar, the clutter effect and the noise power. As a result,
the interference signal can be modeled as
yinterf(kl) = (
L∑
j 6=l
wHr(k,l)ht(kj)%k,l,j(τl,j)+
K∑
m6=k
L∑
j=1
wHr(k,l)λt(kmj)%k,l,m,j(τl,j)+
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K∑
m 6=k
wHr(k,l)µt(km) +
L∑
i=1
wHr(k,l)ct(ki) + nˆ) (2)
where %k,l,m,j(τl,j) denotes the correlation factor between
the waveform emitted from the kth radar and echoed by the
lth target and the waveform emitted from the mth radar but
echoed by the jth target.
Since we defined the desired and interfering signals for
radar-k regarding target-l in (1) and (2), the relevant SINR
is straightforwardly defined as
SINRkl =
‖ydes(kl)‖2
‖yinterf(kl)‖2 (3)
where || · || denotes the Euclidian norm.
Using the above system model, the next section describes
the game theoretic formulation of the proposed scheme.
III. BEAMFORMER DESIGN AND POWER ALLOCATION
GAME
A. Game Theoretic Formulation
In order to determine the optimal transmit/receive beam-
formers and power allocation between the radars, we incor-
porate an SNG. The various radars are considered as players,
and therefore the player set is denoted by C = {1, . . . ,K}.
Consider the transmit beamforming weight vector matrix
Wt(k) = {wt(k,1), . . . ,wt(k,L)} as the strategy of player-k
and the matrix Wt(−k) as the strategy chosen by the other
players. Hence, we define the acceptable strategy set for radar-
k as
Pk(Wt(−k)) = {Wt(k) ∈ CM×L | SINRkl ≥ γkl,∀l}
where γkl is the desired SINR for target-l when targeted from
the antennas of radar-k. The decision on the desired SINR
depends on the probabilities of misdetection Pmd and false
alarm Pfa, which are derived from the following equations
[24], [25]:
Pmd(ξkl) = (1− ξkl)N−1
Pfa(SINRkl, ξkl) = 1−
(
1− ξkl
1− ξkl
1
1 +NSINRkl
)1−N
where ξkl denotes the threshold of the generalized likelihood
ratio test (GLRT), applied to determine if there is absence or
presence of a target [25] and N is the number of samples used
for the GLRT. We define a specific design parameter εkl to
set an upper bound on the tolerance regarding Pmd and Pfa.
Hence, the optimum SINRkl for each radar regarding each
target can be determined as [20], [21]:
γ∗kl = min{SINRkl | ∃ξkl ∈ [0, 1]
s.t. Pmd(ξkl) + Pfa(SINRkl, ξkl) ≤ εkl}.
It is evident from (3) that the SINRkl for player-k is a
function of the beamforming weight vectors (which include
transmission power) of all players. Hence, the set of admissible
strategies Pk(Wt(−k)) for radar-k depends on the beamform-
ing weight matrix Wt(−k) of every other player (radar).
The last component required to complete the game is
the utility function for each player, which is defined as
uk(Wt(k)) = ‖Wt(k)‖2F representing the transmit power of
player-k, where || · ||F denotes the Frobenius norm. The game
is summarized as
G =< C, {Pk(Wt(−k))}k∈C , {uk(Wt(k))}k∈C >
In the SNG considered, given the beamforming strategies
of the other players, each player selfishly minimizes its power
allocation subject to a predefined detection criterion. As a
result, the best response strategy for player-k is the result of
the following optimization:
min
Wt(k)
‖Wt(k)‖2F (4)
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j 6=l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl,∀l
where r−k = [r−k1, . . . , r−kL]T is the total interfer-
ence induced by all other radars except radar-k plus the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) from the envi-
ronment vector. For target-l, it is defined as r−kl =∑K
m6=k
∑L
j=1 |wHt(k,l)λr(kmj)|2+
∑K
m6=k |wHt(k,l)µr(km)|2+σ2n.
One of the main objectives of this work is to investigate
whether the game G converges to a stable point, where no
player can profit by unilaterally changing its beamforming
strategy, as it will lead to higher power consumption to achieve
the same SINR for every target. Such a point is a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) and for the game considered, it is defined
as the strategy set {W∗t(1), . . . ,W∗t(K)} where:
uk(W
∗
t(k)) ≤ uk(Wt(k)), ∀Wt(k) ∈ Pk(W∗t(−k)),∀k ∈ C
In the next section we will determine the optimal beampat-
terns and investigate the best response strategy. We will also
prove the existence and uniqueness of the NE of the game G.
B. Convex Optimization Beamforming and the Best Response
Strategy
Convex optimization has been widely utilized in the radar
beamforming literature. Most of the work concentrates on
designing the beamforming vectors in order to approximate a
desired beampattern, decided by the target position [26]-[29].
In the first stage of this analysis, we determine the optimal
beampattern for every radar corresponding to each of the
targets using convex optimization techniques. After securing
the optimal beampatterns, each player should just allocate
the minimum possible transmission power, while minimizing
the inter-radar interference and achieving a certain detection
performance.
The optimal transmit beampatterns for each radar can be
designed by solving the following optimization problem:
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min
Wt(k)
L∑
l=1
‖wt(k,l)‖2 (5)
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j 6=l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl,∀l
The optimization in (5) can be converted to semidefinite
programming (SDP) using the rank relaxation method and
solved as in [30] and [31]. The optimal receive weight vectors
can be found using generalised eigenvector techniques.
Claim 1: The optimal transmit and receive beampatterns
are independent of the inter-radar interference r−k.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Hence, when the radars reallocate the power of transmission,
the inter-radar interference plus noise vector r−k is modified.
From Claim 1, radar-k retains the optimal beampatterns de-
rived from (5), however reallocates only its transmission power
for each target, in order to achieve the detection criterion.
This observation is similar to that considered in wireless
communication applications [12], regardless of the appearance
of additional clutter in the denominator of the SINR equation
in (5). As a result, after obtaining the optimal transmit/receive
beamforming vectors, we can reformulate the initial optimiza-
tion problem (4) as a power minimization problem shown
in (6), where wˆt(k,l) =
w∗t(k,l)
‖w∗
t(k,l)
‖ is the normalized optimal
transmit weight vector and pkl is the power used by radar-k
on the beam directed to target-l. At this point, by redefining
the acceptable strategy as P ′k(p−k) = {pk ∈ RL+ | SINRkl ≥
γkl,∀l} and the utility function as u′k(pk) =
∑L
l=1 pkl, game
G becomes a power allocation SNG:
G′ =< C, {P ′k(p−k)}k∈C , {u′k(pk)}k∈C >
In order to prove the existence and the uniqueness of the NE
of game G, we need to show that the best response strategy
for every player is a standard function. We note that all the
constraints must be active at the optimal power allocation. As
a result, the inequality in the constraints of (6) can be replaced
by equality and can be written as:
Gkp
∗
k = r−k (7)
where Gk ∈ RL×L and its elements are defined as
[Gk]ii = (
|wˆHt(k,i)hr(ki)|2
γki
− |wˆHt(k,i)cr(ki)|2) and [Gk]ij =
−|wˆHt(k,i)hr(kj)|2− |wˆHt(k,i)cr(kj)|2, for i 6= j. The solution of
(7) provides the optimal power allocation for (6). Following
Claim 2 in [12], the problem (6) is always feasible ∀r−k > 0
elementwise. As a result, the matrix Gk must be invertible so
we can straightforwardly obtain the best response strategy for
the kth cluster as:
p∗k = G
−1
k r−k (8)
The existence of the solution is guaranteed through the
Arrow-Debreu theorem [33]. Since the NE exists, the unique-
ness of this NE is proved by establishing the best response
function is standard [12]. We define the inter-cluster interfer-
ence matrix from the mth radar to the kth radar as Gmk ∈
RL×L and [Gmk]i,j = |wˆHt(k,i)λr(kmj)|2 + |wˆHt(k,i)µr(km)|2.
Hence, by replacing the interference vector r−k, we can restate
the best response strategy as:
BRk(p−q) = p∗k = G
−1
k
 K∑
m6=k
Gmkp
∗
m + 1Lσ
2
n
 ,∀k (9)
where 1L denotes the all ones vector of size L× 1.
Lemma 1: The best response function (9) is a standard
function.
Proof: The best response strategy (9) satisfies the following
necessary properties for all p ≥ 0:
a) Positivity: BRk(p) > 0, as G−1k is a positive matrix
straightforwardly from (8) and Gmk is a positive matrix from
its definition.
b) Monotonicity: If p ≥ p′, then:
BRk(p)−BRk(p′) = G−1k
 K∑
m6=k
Gmk(pm − p′m)
 ≥ 0
c) Scalability: For all a > 1, aBRk(p) > BRk(ap).
Indeed:
aBRk(p)−BRk(ap) = (a− 1)G−1k 1Lσ2n > 0.
By applying a pricing policy to each player we introduce
some cooperation among them, which leads to a more Pareto
efficient solution, as described in the next section.
IV. BEAMFORMER DESIGN AND POWER ALLOCATION
GAME WITH PRICING
A. Game Theoretical formulation
Since each radar optimizes its beamformers and power allo-
cation greedily, the equilibrium point is not necessarily the best
solution from a social fairness point of view. This is explained
because each player ignores the direct path interference it
induces on other players. In order to obtain a more Pareto
efficient solution and to increase the social welfare of the SNG,
we introduce a pricing scheme applied to each radar’s utility
function. As a result, the players are encouraged to allocate
their available resources more efficiently by minimizing the
direct path interference induced to the other radars.
In order to achieve the aforementioned advantages, each
radar/player needs to have information about the channel to
the other radars in the system. Since we assume that the
radars belong to the same organization, the knowledge of the
channels between the radars is justified, as each radar knows
the exact position of the others. Hence, each radar performs
the following optimization:
min
Wt(k)
L∑
l=1
‖wt(k,l)‖2 +
K∑
m6=k
L∑
i=1
κkmi‖wt(k,i)µr(km)‖2
(10)
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min
pk1,...,pkL
L∑
l=1
pkl (6)
s.t.
pkl|wˆHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j 6=l
pkj |wˆHt(k,l)hr(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
pki|wˆHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j 6=l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl,∀l
where κkmi is the price charged to radar k for the inter-
ference it induces to radar m when aiming at target i and
‖wt(k,i)µr(km)‖2 denotes the corresponding interference.
The aforementioned optimization encourages each player
to adopt a more socially efficient power allocation strategy by
steering its beampattern to the desired target, while keeping
the sidelobes at the direction of the other players low and
therefore causing less interference to other radars. As a result,
the efficiency of the system as a whole is improved, yet the
distributed nature of the game is preserved.
In order to reformulate the SNG G to a more cooperative
game with pricing cosideration, we just need to redefine the
utility function of radar k as vk(Wt(k)) = ‖Wt(k)‖2F +∑K
m 6=k
∑L
i=1 κkmi‖wt(k,i)µkm‖2. The mathematical form of
the pricing game is:
Gpr =< C, {Pk(Wt(−k))}k∈C , {vk(Wt(k))}k∈C >
B. Optimal Beamforming and the Best Response Strategy
In this section, we design the optimal transmit and receive
beamformers and the best response strategy for each of the
players. Therefore, we exploit the fact that the optimization
problem (10) can be reformulated as a convex optimization
problem with second order cone (SOC) constraints [30]. This
important property allows us to obtain the optimal solution
via duality. The Lagrangian associated with the optimization
problem (10) can be written as:
L(Wt(k),λk) =
L∑
l=1
‖wt(k,l)‖2
+
K∑
m6=k
L∑
i=1
κkmi‖wt(k,i)µr(km)‖2
+
L∑
l=1
λkl
( L∑
j 6=l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
− 1
γkl
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
)
where λk = [λk1, . . . , λkL]T is the L × 1 vector of the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the SINR inequality
constraints of the problem in (10). The Lagrangian can be
reorganized as:
L(Wt(k),λk) =
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl +
L∑
l=1
wHt(k,l)
(
Ωk(κkml)
−λkl
γkl
hr(ki)h
H
r(ki) +
L∑
j 6=l
λkjhr(kj)h
H
r(kj)
+
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki)
)
wt(k,l)
where Ωk(κkmi) =
∑K
m6=k
∑L
i=1 κkmiµr(km)µ
H
r(km) + I.
At this point, we define the Lagrange dual function as the
minimum value of the Lagrangian over Wt(k):
gk(λk) = inf
Wt(k)
L(Wt(k),λk)
It is clear that if Ωk(κkml) − λklγkl hr(ki)hHr(ki) +∑L
j 6=l λkjhr(kj)h
H
r(kj) +
∑L
i=1 λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki) is not positive
semi-definite, the Lagrangian is unbounded below in Wt(k)
and the dual function can take the value −∞. Hence, the
dual problem associated with (10) can be formulated as:
max
λk1,...,λkL
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl (11)
s.t.
L∑
i=1
λklhr(ki)h
H
r(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki) + Ωk(κkml)

(
1 +
1
γkl
)
λklhr(kl)h
H
r(kl), ∀l
As mentioned in [34] and [12], where the authors investi-
gate the downlink beamforming problem for communications
application, the dual problem (11) is analogous to the receive
beamforming optimization problem presented in (12).
Since the constraints are satisfied with equality at optimality,
the optimal Lagrangian multipliers can be obtained by apply-
ing the fixed point iteration [34], as shown in (13). As proved
in [34], the fixed point iteration described in (13) is shown
to be a standard function and is guaranteed to converge to a
unique solution, if the optimization problem (11) is feasible.
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min
λk1,...,λkL
wr(k,1),...,wr(k,L)
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl (12)
s.t.
λkl|wHr(k,l)ht(kl)|2
L∑
j 6=l
λkj |wHr(k,l)ht(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHr(k,l)ct(ki)|2 + wHr(k,l)Ωk(κkmi)wr(k,l)
≥ γkl,∀l
λ
(n+1)
kl =
γkl
1 + γkl
× 1
hHt(kl)
(∑L
i=1 λ
n
klht(ki)h
H
t(ki) +
∑L
i=1 λ
n
klct(ki)c
H
t(ki) + Ωk(κkml)
)−1
ht(kl)
(13)
Subsequently, the optimal receive weight vector is the
minimum mean-square error (MMSE) receiver, obtained as
the following equation:
wr(k,l) =
( L∑
i=1
λklht(ki)h
H
t(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklct(ki)c
H
t(ki)
+Ωk(κkml)
)−1
ht(kl) (14)
Following [35], we can obtain the optimal transmit beam-
former as a scaled version of the receive weight vector,
wt(k,l) =
√
δk,lwr(k,l), where δk,l is a scalar factor. The
scaling factors δk,l can be found by exploiting the fact that the
SINR constraints in (10) are met with equality at optimality.
Hence by replacing wt(k,l) =
√
δk,lwr(k,l) into the SINR
constraints, the scaling factors can be found from the following
equation:
δk = F
−1r−k (15)
where δk = [δk1, δk2, . . . , δkL]T and F ∈ RL×L and is
defined as [F]ii = (
|wHr(k,i)ht(ki)|2
γki
− |wHr(k,i)ct(ki)|2) and
[F]ij = −|wHr(k,i)ht(kj)|2 − |wHr(k,i)ct(kj)|2, for i 6= j.
Having decided the optimal transmit and receive beamform-
ers, the solution of problem (10) is concluded. Similar to
the game without pricing consideration, we can reformulate
the initial optimization problem (10) as a power minimization
problem. Following the same analysis as in Section III and
by denoting the power vector of radar k as pik ∈ RL+, the best
response strategy for the kth radar can be obtained from the
following equation:
pi∗k = ∆
−1
k r−k (16)
where ∆k ∈ RL×L and is defined as [∆k]ii =
(
|wHt(k,i)hr(ki)|2
γki
− |wHt(k,i)cr(ki)|2) and [∆k]ij =
−|wHt(k,i)hr(kj)|2 − |wHt(k,i)cr(kj)|2, for i 6= j. Moreover,
we denote the inter-radar interference matrix from
the mth radar to the kth radar as ∆mk ∈ RL×L
and [∆mk]i,j = |wHt(k,i)λkmj |2 + |wHt(ki)µr(km)|2.
Consequently, by replacing the interference vector
r−k =
∑K
m6=k ∆mkp
∗
m + 1σ
2
n we can redefine the best
response strategy as:
BRk(pi−k) = pi∗k = ∆
−1
k
 K∑
m 6=k
∆mkpi
∗
m + 1σ
2
n
 ,∀k
(17)
Lemma 2: The best response function (16) of the game
with pricing consideration is a standard function.
Proof: The proof is identical to that in Lemma 1.
In the next section we present a hierarchical strategic game,
known as Stackelberg game.
V. STACKELBERG GAME SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 2: A hybrid distributed MIMO radar network with a
surveillance radar, two tracking radars and two targets.
In this section, we consider a hybrid MIMO network.
More specifically, in addition to the multistatic tracking radar
network mentioned in Section II, we incorporate a surveillance
radar as part of the network, as seen in Fig.2. We assume that
all radars belong to the same organization and operate in the
same field. As a result, the tracking radars may interfere with
the surveillance radar and deteriorate its performance (increase
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the probability of false alarm). In order to guarantee the
unimpeded operation of the system, the interference observed
at the surveillance radar must not exceed a specific value, as
shown below:
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|qHr(sur)gkl|2 ≤ Imax (18)
where gkl = wHt(k,l)a(θsur(k)) denotes the interfering signal in
the direction of the surveillance radar when the kth tracking
radar tags target l, θsur(k) is the direction of the surveillance
radar as observed from the kth tracking radar, and Imax is the
maximum interference allowed. Since there is no transmit or
receive beamformer at the surveillance radar, its receive filter
qr(sur) is a complex scalar.
In order to guarantee constraint (18), an interference cost
can be imposed on every tracking radar in order to minimize
their effect on the surveillance radar. Thus, a similar pricing
mechanism to the previous section can be applied to every
radar with the main objective to minimize the direct path
interference to the surveillance radar. Owing to the fact that
all radars belong to the same organization, we can safely
assume that the information of the inter-radar channels is
given. Similarly to the previous section, each tracking radar
performs the following optimization:
min
Wt(k)
L∑
l=1
‖wt(k,l)‖2 +
L∑
i=1
κsur‖wt(k,i)gkl‖2 (19)
s.t.
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
L∑
j 6=l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl
≥ γkl,∀l
where κsur is the pricing factor of interference, which is
equally imposed by the surveillance radar to all tracking
radars.
This interaction between the radars can be translated to
a power allocation Stackelberg game, where the surveillance
radar is the leader and the tracking radars are the followers.
The strategy of the leader is the price of interference charged
to the followers and the leader’s utility function is its profit,
which is defined as:
slead =
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2κsur (20)
Based on the price imposed by the leader, the followers decide
their best response strategy as the result of the optimization
in (19).
A. Followers’ Game
Since the followers know the price of interference an-
nounced by the leader, they decide their optimal beamformers
and resource allocation by solving the optimization problem
in (19). In order to formulate the followers’ game, we ob-
serve that this game is similar to the game Gpr, when we
redefine the utility function of player k as sk(Wt(k)) =
‖Wt(k)‖2F+
∑L
i=1 κsur‖wt(k,i)gkl‖2. Hence the mathematical
representation of the followers’ game is:
Gfol =< C, {Pk(Wt(−k))}k∈C , {sk(Wt(k))}k∈C >
Following the same analysis as for game Gpr, the optimal
beamforming vectors can be derived by exploiting the duality
properties of the convex optimization problem (18). Hence,
respectively to the receive weight vector optimization problem
(12), we address the optimization problem in (21).
We denote λ¯k = [λ¯k1, . . . , λ¯kL]T as the L × 1 vector of
the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the inequality SINR
constraints of problem (19), Ωk(κsur) =
∑L
i=1 κsurgklg
H
kl+I
and w¯r(k,l) as the M × 1 receive weight vector for radar-
k regarding target-l for the study of the Stackelberg game.
Similar to (13), we obtain the optimal Lagrangian multipliers
from (22) (the fixed point iteration in (22) is a standard
function and admits a unique solution [34]) and the optimal
receive beamformers through the MMSE receiver as:
w¯r(k,l) =
( L∑
i=1
λ¯klht(ki)h
H
t(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λ¯klct(ki)c
H
t(ki)
+Ωk(κsur)
)−1
ht(kl) (23)
The optimal transmit beamformers are scaled versions of
the optimal receive weight vectors:
w¯t(k,l) =
√
δk,lw¯r(k,l) (24)
Correspondingly to the method of Gpr and by indicating the
power vector of radar k as ρk ∈ RL+, the best response strategy
for the kth radar can be obtained from the following equation:
ρ∗k = Ξ
−1
k r−k (25)
where Ξk ∈ RL×L and is defined as [Ξk]ii =
(
|w¯Ht(k,i)hr(ki)|2
γki
− |w¯Ht(ki)cr(ki)|2) and [Ξk]ij =
−|w¯Ht(ki)hr(kj)|2 − |w¯Ht(ki)cr(kj)|2, for i 6= j. Furthermore,
we denote the inter-radar interference matrix from
the mth radar to the kth radar as Ξmk ∈ RL×L
and [Ξmk]i,j = |w¯Ht(ki)λr(kmj)|2 + |w¯Ht(ki)µr(km)|2.
Consequently, by replacing the interference vector
r−k =
∑K
m6=k Ξmkp
∗
m + 1σ
2
n we can redefine the best
response strategy as:
BRk(ρ−k) = ρ
∗
k = Ξ
−1
k
 K∑
m6=k
Ξmkρ
∗
m + 1σ
2
n
 ,∀k (26)
The study on the existence and the uniqueness of the solution
is similar to the one in Section II.
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min
λ¯k1,...,λ¯kL
w¯r(k,1),...,w¯r(k,L)
L∑
l=1
λ¯klr−kl (21)
s.t.
λ¯kl|w¯Hr(k,l)ht(kl)|2
L∑
j 6=l
λ¯kj |w¯Hr(k,l)ht(kj)|2 +
L∑
i=1
|w¯Hr(k,l)ct(ki)|2 + w¯Hr(k,l)Ωk(κsur)w¯r(k,l)
≥ γkl,∀l
λ¯
(n+1)
kl =
γkl
1 + γkl
× 1
hHt(kl)
(∑L
i=1 λ¯
n
klht(ki)h
H
t(ki) +
∑L
i=1 λ¯
n
klct(ki)c
H
t(ki) + Ωk(κsur)
)−1
hkl
(22)
B. Leader’s Game
From the definition of the Stackelberg game, the leader
knows the best response strategy of the followers. Likewise
in our model, the surveillance radar is aware of the existence
of the tracking radars, as they belong to the same organization,
and can determine the followers best response strategy. Hence,
the leader’s optimal strategy is extracted from the following
optimization problem, where the leader’s profit is maximized,
while the interference is constrained under a maximum value
to guarantee the efficient performance of the surveillance radar.
max
κsur
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2κsur (27)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2 ≤ Imax
In order to determine the optimal price imposed by the
leader to the tracking radars and solve the optimization prob-
lem (27), we adopt the learning algorithm for the leader as
proposed in [16]. Initially, we determine the price κ∗sur, where
the constraint of the optimization problem (27) is met with
equality:
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
|wHr(sur)gkl|2 = Imax (28)
Hence, since the interference is a decreasing function of the
price imposed by the leader, the constraint can be guaranteed
when the price charged to the followers is not less than κ∗sur,
i.e. κsur ≥ κ∗sur. In Algorithm 1, we assume α is the learning
rate of the algorithm (α > 0) and κtsur is the price imposed
by the leader at iteration t.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present some simulation results to illus-
trate the performance of the beamformers and the convergence
of the resource allocation methods for all three different
games, which are the beamformer design and power allocation
SNG, the beamformer design and power allocation game with
pricing policy and the Stackelberg game. Thus, we consider a
bistatic network of two tracking MIMO radars, where each one
consists of 10 transmit/receive antennas with half-wavelength
Algorithm 1: Learning algorithm for optimization prob-
lem (27)
1 Set an initial price κ1sur = κ
∗
sur determined at the
equality of the constraint of optimization problem (27);
2 Determine an increment ∆κsur and set the second price
value as: κ2sur = κ
∗
sur + ∆κsur
3 Set t = 1
4 while the convergence is not reached do:
5 Obtain the best response strategies for the tracking
radars, by playing the followers’ game at price κtsur
6 Calculate the profit of the leader slead at price κtsur
7 Determine the new price from the following learning
equation:
8
κt+2sur = max
(
1 + α
st+1lead − stlead
κt+1sur − κtsur
κt+1sur , κ
∗
sur
)
(29)
9 Set t = t+ 1
10 end while
spacing between adjacent antennas. The referential direction of
the second radar as seen from the first radar is θrad(1,2) = 72o
and θrad(2,1) = −75o conversely. Moreover, we assume two
targets placed at directions θ11 = 37o, θ12 = 22o as observed
from the first radar and θ21 = −38o, θ22 = −12o using
the second radar as reference. Furthermore, we assume strong
clutter as a focal point with directions θcl(1) = 52o from radar-
1 and θcl(2) = −54o using the second radar as reference. The
complex amplitudes of the targets and the clutter radar cross
sections are equal to β1 = β2 = βcl = 1. The background
noise is considered as AWGN with variance 0.4 and the
correlation factors between the waveforms for different targets
l 6= l′ are fixed to be equal to 0.1 (%k,l,l′ = %k,l,m,l′ = 0.1).
A. Comparison of the SNG and the coordinated game with
pricing consideration
The first stage of the algorithm refers to the design of the op-
timal transmit and receive beamformers. In particular, for the
SNG we obtain the aforementioned beamformers using convex
semidefinite programming methods for the optimization prob-
lem (5), whereas for the coordinated game with pricing policy
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we exploit the duality properties of the optimization problem
(10) and we find the transmit and receive weight vectors using
the solution of the dual problem (14). It is obvious that in both
games the beampatterns are concentrated on the desired target
by maintaining very low sidelobe levels in other directions.
Figs. 3-6 clearly depict the tendency towards social welfare of
the game with pricing consideration, since the beampatterns
of the first player enforce deep nulls at the direction of the
other player, minimizing the interference leakage.
(a) Without pricing consideration. (b) With pricing consideration.
Fig. 3: Comparison of the transmit beampatterns for player 1
aiming at target 1 (dB).
(a) Without pricing consideration. (b) With pricing consideration.
Fig. 4: Comparison of the transmit beampatterns for player 1
aiming at target 2 (dB).
(a) Without pricing consideration. (b) With pricing consideration.
Fig. 5: Comparison of the transmit beampatterns for player 2
aiming at target 1 (dB).
The resource allocation optimization is considered at the
second stage of the algorithms for both games compared.
Before the initialization of the games, we decide the detection
criterion for each player by setting the SINR targets at 7 for
radar 1 (γ11 = γ12 = 7) and 6.5 for radar 2 (γ21 = γ22 = 6.5)
for both games. We also set the maximum number of game
iterations at T = 40 to study the convergence of the algo-
rithms. Figs. 8-9 depict the resource allocation update for each
(a) Without pricing consideration. (b) With pricing consideration.
Fig. 6: Comparison of the transmit beampatterns for player 2
aiming at target 2 (dB).
radar aiming each target. Power allocation using both methods
clearly converges to a unique solution. Comparing Fig. 8 to
Fig. 9 the advantages of the coordinated design with pricing
are obvious, since the transmit power of each radar is lower
compared to that of the SNG without pricing consideration.
This result shows that due to the reduced interference among
the radars using the coordinated design, as displayed in Fig.7,
each player needs less power to attain the SINR target, and
hence the resource allocation for this game is more efficient.
Fig. 7: Interference among the MIMO tracking radars with
and without pricing consideration.
Fig. 8: Power allocation convergence for the SNG without
pricing consideration.
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Fig. 9: Power allocation convergence for the coordinated game
with pricing policy.
B. Stackelberg Game
The surveillance radar is placed at direction θsur(1) = 65o
as observed from the first tracking radar and θsur(2) = −67o
using the second radar as reference. Based on the price
announced by the leader, the followers decide their optimal
beamformers and power allocation by following game Gfol.
The transmit weight vectors and the power allocation of the
followers, when the price set by the leader is κsur = 7.4 are
depicted in Figs. 10-11 and Fig. 12, respectively. It is clear
that the beampatterns of both the followers are steered away
from the direction of the leader and hence the interference
leakage to the surveillance radar is minimized.
In order to find the optimal value of the price set by the
leader, we solve the optimization problem in (27) incorpo-
rating the learning algorithm from Section V. We set the
maximum interference allowed at the surveillance radar as
Imax = 0.0103 and the learning rate as α = 0.2. For this
interference threshold, the corresponding price is determined
as κsur = 7.4, which we consider as the initial price for the
leader’s game. The convergence of the price set by the leader is
shown in Fig. 13. As expected, the algorithm rapidly converges
to the starting price κsur = 7.4, which is the minimum price
so that the leader’s interference constraint is secured.
(a) Target 1 (dB). (b) Target 2 (dB).
Fig. 10: Transmit beampatterns for player 1 aiming at targets
1 and 2 respectively (Stackelberg game).
(a) Target 1 (dB). (b) Target 2 (dB).
Fig. 11: Transmit beampatterns for player 2 aiming at targets
1 and 2 respectively (Stackelberg game).
Fig. 12: Power allocation convergence for the follower game
when κsur = 7.4.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have investigated a game theoretic approach to tackle
the problem of joint beamforming and power allocation in
a distributed radar network. At first, we studied an SNG,
without any coordination among the radars/players. Thus each
player greedily decides its optimal beamformers and power
allocation. Furthermore, we incorporated a pricing mechanism
to minimize the inter-radar interference and to improve the
social welfare of the network. The simulation results confirm
Fig. 13: Convergence of the price imposed by the leader.
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that this partially coordinated game provides a more Paretto-
efficient Nash equilibrium. Additionally, we formulated a
Stackelberg game by introducing a surveillance radar within
the network and studied the convergence of both the followers’
and the leader’s games. Finally, the proofs for the existence
and the uniqueness of both the partially coordinated and the
noncooperative games have also been presented.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF CLAIM 1
In order to prove the optimal beampatterns independence of
the inter-radar interference, we investigate the dual problem of
the optimization problem (5). The Lagrangian associated with
the aforementioned problem is given as:
L(Wt(k),λk) =
L∑
l=1
‖wt(k,l)‖2+
L∑
l=1
λkl
( L∑
j 6=l
|wHt(k,l)hr(kj)|2
+
L∑
i=1
|wHt(k,l)cr(ki)|2 + r−kl −
1
γkl
|wHt(k,l)hr(kl)|2
)
where λk = [λk1, . . . , λkL]T is the L × 1 vector of the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the SINR inequality
constraints of the problem in (10). The Lagrangian can be
reformulated as:
L(Wt(k),λk) =
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl+
L∑
l=1
wHt(k,l)
(
I−λkl
γkl
hr(ki)h
H
r(ki)
+
L∑
j 6=l
λkjhr(kj)h
H
r(kj) +
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki)
)
wt(k,l)
Subsequently, we write the Lagrange dual function as:
gk(λk) = inf
Wt(k)
L(Wt(k),λk)
It is clear that I− λklγkl hr(ki)hHr(ki) +
∑L
j 6=l λkjhr(kj)h
H
r(kj) +∑L
i=1 λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki) must be positive semi-definite, for the
dual problem to be feasible. Hence, the dual problem associ-
ated with (5) can be designed as:
max
λk1,...,λkL
L∑
l=1
λklr−kl (30)
s.t.
L∑
i=1
λklhr(ki)h
H
r(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklcr(ki)c
H
r(ki) + I
 λkl
γkl
hr(kl)h
H
r(kl), ∀l
Following [34] and [12], the dual problem (30) can be
solved through the receive beamforming optimization problem
in (31).
Since the constraints are satisfied with equality at optimality,
the optimal Lagrangian multipliers can be derived by applying
the fixed point iteration method as in (32) [36]. It is also
shown in [36] that the fixed point iteration function in (32)
belongs to the framework of standard functions. Thus, the
aforementioned iteration process is guaranteed to converge to
a unique solution, if the respective optimization problem is
feasible.
The optimal receive weight vector is the minimum mean-
square error (MMSE) receiver, obtained from the following
equation:
wr(k,l) =
=
(
L∑
i=1
λklht(ki)h
H
t(ki) +
L∑
i=1
λklct(ki)c
H
t(ki) + I
)−1
ht(kl)
(33)
Following [35], the optimal transmit beamformer can be
obtained as a scaled version of the receive weight vector
wr(k,l). Thus, it is clear that the optimal transmit and receive
beampatterns are independent of the inter-radar plus noise
vector r−k.
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